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Abstract
As more innocents are exonerated and researchers learn more about the causes of wrongful 
convictions, criminal justice practices have been altered to reduce the number of erroneous 
convictions, although reforms have varied widely in scope and substance throughout the nation. 
In this article, we provide an analysis of state-level investigative reforms important to the 
production of wrongful convictions as of mid- 2016. Specifically, we collect and describe reform 
efforts in three investigatory areas: eyewitness identification, forensics, and interrogations. We 
then discuss wrongful conviction reforms and the innocence movement more generally, focusing 
on the importance of continued research into wrongful convictions as a critical policy issue in 
criminal justice.
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it warrants little attention or concern remained persistent throughout much of the 20th 
century. Over the past two decades, however, there has been a major shift in percep-
tion. Due in large part to the “innocence movement” and efforts to free innocent pris-
oners, educate the public, and reform justice systems, we now know that miscarriages 
of justice occur with some frequency. As these errors have been uncovered, we have 
learned a great deal about how our justice system can and does go awry, and, conse-
quently, what can be done to prevent future wrongful convictions.
The lessons learned from exonerations have led to calls for changes in systems of 
criminal justice, and there are indications that innocence reforms have begun to reach 
public policy agendas (Norris, 2012; Zalman, 2006; Zalman & Marion, 2014). 
Although many scholars have studied cases of wrongful convictions and the factors 
that lead to them (e.g., Garrett, 2011; Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, 2003), relatively few 
in the social science community have focused on the policy side of wrongful convic-
tions. When policy reforms are addressed, they almost unexceptionally address dis-
crete problem areas, but it is important to canvass multiple dimensions of 
innocence-related reforms in a more comprehensive fashion (Leo & Gould, 2009).
In this article, we update and build upon an earlier article, which summarized state 
policies related to the prevention of wrongful convictions (Norris, Bonventre, Redlich, & 
Acker, 2011). In particular, we examine three state policies which many researchers 
have identified as contributing to miscarriages of justice, and analyze reform efforts 
which therefore are likely to help reduce the incidence of wrongful convictions: eye-
witness identification, forensics, and interrogations and confessions. Although other 
policies and practices have been linked to wrongful convictions, we limit our focus to 
these three areas because each concerns law enforcement investigations, where the 
process of wrongful conviction frequently originates when an innocent suspect is erro-
neously identified (see Zalman & Larson, forthcoming). Furthermore, eyewitness 
identification procedures, forensic practices and testimony, and interrogation proce-
dures have been studied extensively, resulting in widely accepted policy recommenda-
tions. Finally, each of these areas has been prioritized for reform by advocacy 
organizations such as the Innocence Project.
Our primary goal is to identify binding statewide policy initiatives in these areas, 
whether imposed by legislation, judicial decision, or otherwise, although where appro-
priate, we also address reform efforts adopted locally and at the federal level. Our 
secondary but equally important goal is to position this discussion within the context 
of the innocence movement and encourage scholars to analyze and evaluate policy 
reforms designed to prevent wrongful convictions, rather than focusing narrowly on 
specific cases. The compilation of initiatives provided here offers a benchmark against 
which to assess jurisdiction-specific reform efforts, which should be useful to help 
stimulate researchers, practitioners, and policymakers in their respective efforts to 
investigate, guard against, and correct wrongful convictions.
We begin with a general overview of wrongful convictions, including what is 
known about their prevalence and the factors contributing to their occurrence. We then 
discuss relevant research and suggestions for reform in the areas identified above—
eyewitness identification, forensics, and interrogation practices—and explain whether 
The distinguished jurist Learned Hand once said that the wrongful conviction of an 
innocent person is “an unreal dream” (U.S. v. Garsson, 1923). This belief that the 
criminal justice system is infallible or, at the very least, errs with such infrequency that
and how states have addressed the associated problems. We conclude with a call for 
increased scholarly attention to the policy dimensions of innocence-related justice sys-
tems reforms.
Overview of Wrongful Convictions
Although it is impossible to know with certainty how often innocent people are con-
victed, scholars have relied on various methods to estimate their prevalence. An 
early survey of criminal justice practitioners from Ohio, including state attorneys 
general and police, judges, and lawyers, reported that the respondents believed that 
less than 5%, and more likely less than 1%, of criminal convictions are erroneous 
(Huff, Rattner, & Sagarin, 1986). Risinger (2007) examined the cases of defendants 
sentenced to death for rape–murder between 1982 and 1989, and estimated the fac-
tual error rate in such cases to be between 3.3% and 5%. In what is perhaps the most 
empirically grounded estimate of error in death-penalty cases, a report published by 
the National Academy of Sciences conservatively estimated that 4.1% of those sen-
tenced to death between 1973 and 2004 may be innocent (Gross, O’Brien, Hu, & 
Kennedy, 2014).
Despite uncertainty about the true rate of wrongful convictions, more is known 
about exonerations or those cases in which the erroneous conviction of innocent per-
sons has been detected and reversed. In all likelihood, these cases represent only “the 
tip of the iceberg of a much more deeply flawed justice system” (Feld, 2012, p. 244). 
That is, these known exonerations almost certainly do not represent all wrongful con-
victions since 1989 but instead are a relatively small, unrepresentative sample of mis-
carriages of justice that happened to be discovered and overturned. The Innocence 
Project, which tracks only exonerations secured through postconviction deoxyribo-
nucleic acid (DNA) testing, lists 347 innocents who have been exonerated since 1989 
(as of December 2016) on the basis of DNA evidence. The National Registry of 
Exonerations, which tracks both DNA and non-DNA exonerations since 1989, identi-
fies 1,934 cases as of December 2016.
Although exonerations are an incomplete and likely unrepresentative sample of 
cases of the wrongful conviction of innocent defendants, they provide a window into 
where and how the criminal justice system can malfunction, from investigation 
through the adjudication process. They reveal that errors can occur both at trial and via 
plea bargaining, and that a number of factors are common correlates of and contribu-
tors to wrongful convictions. This “canonical list” (Gross, 2008, p. 186) includes eye-
witness misidentification, forensic science issues (including errors, misconduct, 
shifted science, and discredited techniques), false confessions, unreliable snitches and 
informants, government misconduct, and poor defense lawyering. More nuanced anal-
yses have helped distinguish between factors which are causal and those which tend to 
co-occur with wrongful convictions (Gould, Carrano, Leo, & Hail-Jares, 2014). 
Furthermore, there are likely deeper “root causes” (Leo, 2005, p. 213) that have yet to 
be unearthed. For example, Lofquist (2014) suggested that justice system errors are 
tied to wider social, cultural, and political developments, and scholars seeking a deeper 
understanding of wrongful convictions should look to broader issues such as mass 
imprisonment, the “Southern Strategy,” and the war on drugs (see also Laqueur, 
Rushin, & Simon, 2014). Najdowski’s (2011, 2014) research suggests that cultural 
stereotypes about race may create a pipeline for the wrongful convictions of African 
Americans by affecting the behaviors of both law enforcement officials and citizens. 
Some have even argued that the adversary system itself is conducive to and may even 
help produce wrongful convictions (Vidmar & Coleman, 2014; Zalman, 2008).
These broader causes of wrongful convictions remain cloudy, and the majority of 
innocence scholarship, advocacy, and policy reform remain focused on the “canonical 
list” described above. Thus, although several factors are likely to contribute to wrong-
ful convictions, we collected and present information about three investigative prac-
tices that have spawned relatively clear and well-established policy recommendations: 
eyewitness identification, forensic science, and police interrogation. We began by con-
sulting information made available by advocacy organizations such as the Innocence 
Project, professional organizations like the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers (NACDL), state criminal justice agency websites, news reports, and previ-
ously published research. We also consulted statutes, court decisions, and other offi-
cial directives. Where appropriate, we compared the identified policy reforms with 
best practices recommended by scholars, advocates, and national research organiza-
tions (e.g., the National Institute of Justice [NIJ] and the National Research Council). 
To the best of our knowledge, all policies are current as of mid-2016.
Eyewitness Identification
Eyewitness errors are among the leading factors contributing to wrongful convictions. 
The Innocence Project reports that misidentification was a factor in 235 of the first 325 
DNA exonerations (72.3%). In the National Registry of Exonerations database, mis-
taken identifications played a role in 579 of 1,934 exonerations (29.9%), including 
203 of 294 (69%) sexual assault cases.
The fallibility of eyewitnesses is not a newly discovered phenomenon. Munsterberg 
(1908) wrote in the early 20th century about the unreliability of eyewitnesses and how 
they can affect trial outcomes, and psychologists have devoted significant time and 
resources to studying eyewitness-related issues since the 1970s (see Smalarz & Wells, 
2015). Among the topics considered have been the particular vulnerabilities and poten-
tial unreliability of certain types of eyewitnesses (particularly children); false memo-
ries; information processing, retention, and recall; and the effects of feedback given to 
witnesses during and following identification procedures. Two general categories of 
factors can influence the reliability of identifications: system variables and estimator 
variables. System variables “are (or potentially can be) under the direct control of the 
criminal justice system” (Wells, 1978, p. 1548) and include the actual identification 
procedures used, including personnel, instructions, type of lineup, and construction of 
the lineup. In contrast, estimator variables include the characteristics of the witness 
(such as age, race, eyesight) or of the situation (such as lighting, distance, presence or 
absence of a weapon) over which the system has no control.
These issues have been studied extensively, and in the late 1990s, the American 
Psychology-Law Society assembled a group of researchers to review the scientific 
evidence on eyewitness procedures and issue a “white paper” with recommendations 
for best practices (Wells et al., 1998). Many of their recommendations were adopted 
by the NIJ when the NIJ formulated eyewitness identification procedure guidelines 
for law enforcement agencies in 1999. Psychological research has since continued, 
and findings regarding witnesses’ perceptions, understanding, judgment, and deci-
sion making have led to a series of recommended reforms designed to enhance reli-
able identification procedures, and hence reduce the risk of erroneous arrests and 
convictions.
Witness Instructions
When participating in an identification procedure, witnesses may assume that the 
actual perpetrator is present in the lineup or photo array, and thus feel obliged to make 
an identification. Providing witnesses with specific instructions may help counter this 
potentially erroneous assumption. Thus, it is recommended that witnesses be told that 
the true perpetrator may or may not be displayed, and that they should not feel com-
pelled to make an identification. Research has found that witnesses are less likely to 
select the wrong person when given this instruction (N. M. Steblay, 1997). In addition, 
the National Research Council (2014) and the Innocence Project suggest that wit-
nesses should be told that the investigation will continue whether or not they make an 
identification.
As discussed below, law enforcement officers’ conduct during an identification 
procedure can have important consequences. To prevent problems associated with 
officer feedback, witnesses also should be instructed that the attending officer does not 
know the identity of the actual suspect, or as the Innocence Project (n.d.-a) suggests, 
that they should “not look to the administrator for guidance.”. Finally, the NIJ (1999) 
has suggested telling witnesses that “it is just as important to clear innocent persons 
from suspicion as to identify guilty parties” (p. 32).
Blind Procedures
The officer(s) conducting the identification procedure can influence witnesses in vari-
ous ways. In many situations, the officer administering the lineup or photo array is 
involved in the case and consequently is aware of the suspect’s identity. This officer 
then interacts with the witness before, during, and after the procedure. There is a risk 
that administrators will knowingly or unknowingly provide verbal or visual cues that 
can affect how witnesses approach the lineup, their expectations, the decisions they 
make, and their degree of confidence in their decisions (e.g., Harris & Rosenthal, 1985; 
N. M. Steblay, 1997; N. K. Steblay, Wells, & Douglass, 2014; Wells et al., 1998).
To avoid such complications, experts and advocates, including the Innocence 
Project and the National Research Council (2014), have recommended that the police 
use blind or double-blind lineup procedures, meaning that the officer administering 
the lineup does not know who the suspect is and thus cannot provide confirming or 
disconfirming feedback (Wells et al., 1998). Experimental studies have consistently 
shown that cues are often provided that do influence witnesses’ behavior, and that a 
blind procedure is a straightforward way of reducing the transmission of such cues 
(see N. K. Steblay, Dysart, & Wells, 2011).
Confidence Statements
One important element of a witness’s identification is the degree of confidence he or 
she displays, which in turn is likely to influence the weight the police and a judge or 
jury places on the identification. The measure of confidence a witness expresses in his 
or her identification may be significantly influenced by what happens after a decision 
is made, including any feedback offered by the officer (Wells & Bradfield, 1998). In 
addition to blind procedures, it is commonly suggested that a record should be made 
of the witness’s confidence immediately following the identification and before any 
feedback is provided (National Research Council, 2014). Doing so creates a contem-
poraneous record of the witness’s confidence and allows the fact finder to evaluate any 
changes in expressed confidence between the initial identification and trial.
Lineup and Photo Array Composition
How a lineup or photo array is constructed can significantly influence the outcome of 
an identification procedure. It therefore is suggested that displays be composed “in 
such a manner that the suspect does not unduly stand out” (NIJ, 1999, p. 29). In par-
ticular, the fillers—the displayed individuals other than the true suspect—ideally 
should be consistent with the witness’s description of the offender and also should 
resemble the suspect. Different identification procedures should be used for each wit-
ness in cases involving multiple witnesses, and the suspect should be placed in differ-
ent positions in a lineup or photo array to help guard against potential biases (Wells 
et al., 1998).
Although there is no set, agreed-upon number of lineup members or photos used in 
an array, the NIJ (1999) recommends a minimum of four fillers for live lineups and 
five fillers for photo spreads. However, absent necessity, there is virtually unanimous 
agreement that a live multiparty lineup or a photo array is preferable to a “show-up,” 
in which a single suspect is presented to the witness. Not surprisingly, research con-
firms that show-ups are suggestive and increase the likelihood of a misidentification 
(Dekle, Beal, Elliott, & Huneycutt, 1996; Wells et al., 1998; Yarmey, Yarmey, & 
Yarmey, 1996).
Sequential Presentation
When witnesses are confronted with multiple subjects or photographs in a group, or 
simultaneously, and are asked to make an identification, they tend to make an identifi-
cation by relying on “relative judgment.” That is, witnesses will often try to determine 
which among the group most closely resembles their memory of the perpetrator and 
make an identification accordingly. This process is in contrast to making an “absolute 
judgment,” wherein the witness determines whether a subject, displayed individually, 
matches his or her recollection of the offender (Wells et al., 1998). When subjects are 
presented simultaneously as a group, “there will always be someone who looks more 
like the culprit” than the others, who risks being identified for that reason alone (Wells 
et al., 1998, p. 10). Consequently, some evidence suggests that using “simultaneous” 
lineups or photo arrays increases erroneous identifications and, in particular, enhances 
the risk of false positives or misidentifying an innocent person (N. K. Steblay et al., 
2011).
As a result, some have suggested using “sequential” presentations in lineups and 
photo arrays, where each subject is presented to the witness one at a time and the wit-
ness is asked whether he or she can make an identification. Sequential presentations 
encourage witnesses to rely on absolute rather than comparative or relative judgments. 
This reform was not formally recommended by Wells and colleagues (1998), although 
they discuss the potential benefits of such a practice, nor is it affirmatively endorsed 
by the Innocence Project (n.d.-a), the National Research Council (2014), or the NIJ 
(1999), although the NIJ report provides best practices for both sequential and simul-
taneous lineups. This lack of an official recommendation is largely based on the debate 
surrounding the potential for the sequential lineup procedure to negatively affect accu-
rate identifications, and in particular of increasing the risk of false negatives, or a wit-
ness’s failure to identify the true perpetrator (Clark, 2012; Wells, 2014).
Recording
As an additional reform, many have suggested video recording the identification pro-
cess to create an objective record of what transpired. Wells et al. (1998) encouraged 
such a practice nearly 20 years ago, and it has been formally recommended by the 
Innocence Project (n.d.-a), the American Bar Association (2004), and the National 
Research Council (2014). The NIJ (1999) also recommends documenting lineup iden-
tifications by photo or video, and preserving witness statements by audio or video 
recording. However, according to a study done by the Police Executive Research 
Forum (2013), less than one third of law enforcement agencies video recorded eyewit-
ness identification procedures.
State Practices
As shown in Table 1, 18 states have addressed eyewitness identification procedures in 
some way, but the adopted “reforms” vary in both scope and quality. All reforms 
resulted from legislation, with three exceptions: New Jersey (Attorney General direc-
tive), Oregon (Supreme Court decision), and Massachusetts (Supreme Judicial Court 
decision). Three states stopped short of mandatory alterations to police practices. 
Rhode Island created a task force that recommended reforms. The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court amended pretrial discovery rules to require prosecutors to 
disclose information about identification procedures and any statements made by eye-
witnesses (Fisher, 2008), and later created a task force that recommended that the 
Court pay attention to psychological knowledge about eyewitnesses and that practices 
be adapted accordingly. The Oregon Supreme Court expressed a preference that iden-
tifications follow scientific best practices rather than mandating changes, and estab-
lished new rules for the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence (State v. 
Lawson, 2012).1
The scope of mandatory reforms varies tremendously in the states that have adopted 
them. For example, in Wisconsin and Virginia, police departments are obliged to adopt 
written policies for conducting eyewitness procedures, but specific best practices are 
only recommended, rather than being required. A similar bill was recently signed by 
Kansas Governor Sam Brownback (Innocence Project, 2016). Nevada simply requires 
that written identification policies be adopted but does not specify what those policies 
should include.
The remaining states require one or more specific reforms, although only 
Connecticut, New Jersey, North Carolina, and West Virginia address all of the major 
issues identified by the scientific community: witness instructions, blind administra-
tion, lineup composition, sequential presentation, witness confidence statements, 
feedback, and recording. The remaining states—Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, 
Ohio, Texas, and Vermont—address subsets of these issues.
Table 1. State Eyewitness Reform.
State
Blind 
administration
Witness 
instructions
Lineup 
composition
Sequential 
presentation Feedback
Witness 
confidence
Recording 
procedures
CO X X X X
CT X X X X X X X
GA X X X X
IL X X X X X X
KS XX XX XX XX
MD X X X X X X
MA XX XX XX XX XX XX
NVa
NJ X X X X X X X
NC X X X X X X X
OH X X X X X
OR XX XX XX XX XX XX
RI XX XX XX XX XX XX
TX X X X X
VT X X X X
VA XX XX XX XX XX XX XX
WV X X X X X X X
WI XX XX XX XX
Note. X = required to some degree; XX = recommended/preferred.
aNevada requires departments to adopt written procedures for eyewitness identifications but does not specify what 
those procedures must include.
The comprehensiveness of state reforms varies with respect to the specific identifi-
cation issues. For instance, North Carolina requires that eyewitnesses be instructed 
that the perpetrator may or may not be present, that the administrator does not know 
the suspect’s identity, that witnesses should not feel compelled to make an identifica-
tion, that it is as important to exclude innocents as it is to identify the perpetrator, and 
that the investigation will continue whether or not the witness makes an identification. 
Georgia, on the contrary, only requires that the witness be told that the suspect may or 
may not be present. Similar variability characterizes the requirements for lineup con-
struction. For example, Connecticut has at least nine requirements, including specify-
ing the number of fillers, instructions regarding multiple lineups, and rules pertaining 
to speech or gestures by lineup members. In contrast, Colorado only stipulates that 
fillers should be consistent with the witness’s original description.
It also is worth noting that only six states—Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, North 
Carolina, Ohio, and Texas—explicitly address the consequences for failing to comply 
with the guidelines. In no state does noncompliance automatically preclude the 
admission of the eyewitness evidence. Rather, the norm is that the deviation may be 
considered in motions to suppress the evidence and may result in a cautionary jury 
instruction.
Forensic Science Errors
According to the National Registry of Exonerations, 23.5% of the first 1,934 cases 
(n = 454 as of December 2016) had “false or misleading forensic evidence” as a contrib-
uting factor (National Registry of Exonerations, n.d.). The Innocence Project (n.d.-b) 
notes that in “about half of DNA exonerations, unvalidated or improper forensic sci-
ence contributed to the wrongful conviction.” Scholars and practitioners have long been 
aware of forensic science evidence problems that could lead to wrongful convictions 
(see, for example, Giannelli, 1997; Peterson & Leggett, 2007). Early proficiency testing 
programs showed unsatisfactory performance in many forensic disciplines in laborato-
ries across the United States (Peterson & Leggett, 2007). In addition, numerous inci-
dents have been reported in which forensic analysts engaged in misconduct in the 
laboratory or provided misleading testimony that contributed to wrongful convictions 
(e.g., Cole, 2005; Giannelli, 1997; Hsu, 2012). When advocates began to use postcon-
viction DNA testing to demonstrate the innocence of incarcerated individuals, analysis 
of those cases showed that forensic science evidence was a common correlate (Connors, 
Lundregan, Miller, & McEwen, 1996). Garrett and Neufeld (2009) analyzed trial tran-
scripts in DNA exoneration cases where forensic evidence was used at trial and found 
that 61% of the cases involved invalid forensic science testimony. Consequently, along-
side awareness of these issues came demands for reform initiatives, including labora-
tory accreditation, quality assurance programs, examiner certification, and independent 
oversight of crime laboratories (Giannelli, 1997, 2007). For present purposes, we will 
focus on two of these mechanisms to ensure the validity and reliability of forensic sci-
ence evidence in the criminal process: independent oversight of crime laboratories and 
accreditation of forensic science services. Although all of the suggested reforms are 
important, we concentrate on these two because these are areas in which states have 
made some progress. However, before discussing state reform efforts, it is worth 
examining relevant developments at the federal level.
Federal Initiatives
Nationally, crime laboratory scrutiny resulted in a 2009 National Research Council 
report (“NRC Report”) that critically examined the state of forensic science practice in 
the United States. The report noted disparities in terms of quality, reliability, educa-
tion, training, and funding, among others, and made 13 recommendations for improve-
ment (National Research Council, 2009). One recommendation recognized a need for 
an independent federal agency to lead efforts to improve forensic science practice 
across the country, and thus proposed the development of a national entity to oversee 
forensic science practice. The report also called for mandatory laboratory accredita-
tion (National Research Council, 2009). In response to the NRC Report, the U.S. 
Department of Justice established the National Commission on Forensic Science 
(NCFS) in 2013 to make national-level recommendations for strengthening forensic 
science practice (Department of Justice, 2015). The NCFS is comprised of stakehold-
ers from all levels of government and includes forensic service providers, prosecutors, 
members of the legal profession, and law enforcement (Department of Justice, 2015). 
In addition, noting the role of forensic science in wrongful convictions, the President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST; 2016) recently issued a 
special report with recommendations regarding the uses of forensic science in criminal 
courts.
It is important to note that the NCFS is not the national governing body with the 
power to establish and enforce best practices for forensic science and standards for 
mandatory laboratory accreditation, as contemplated by the NRC Report (see National 
Research Council, 2009). Since its inception in 2013, the NCFS has made several 
recommendations to improve the reliability of forensic services. One recommendation 
calls for all forensic science service providers (FSSPs) at the federal, state, and local 
levels to become accredited (NCFS, 2015). Accreditation provides an independent 
recognition of a laboratory’s adherence to industry standards. According to the NCFS 
(2015), “Universal accreditation will improve FSSP [sic] ongoing compliance with 
industry best practices, promote standardization, and improve the quality of services 
provided by FSSPs nationally” (p. 2). To encourage nonfederal laboratories to obtain 
accreditation, the NCFS recommendation proposes that the U.S. Attorney General 
requires the Department of Justice to provide grant funding only to nonfederal FSSPs 
who are accredited or undergoing the accreditation process.
The federal Congress also recognized the need for forensic science oversight. The 
Justice for All Act of 2004 (Pub. L. 108-405) required that crime laboratories that 
receive federal forensic science improvement grants certify the existence of an inde-
pendent external government mechanism to investigate serious negligence or miscon-
duct in the recipient laboratories. Although these federal developments are encouraging, 
it remains up to the states to provide independent oversight and accreditation of FSSPs.
State Practices
Forensic science oversight commissions. Beyond the national level, 22 states have created 
commissions2 to examine forensic science evidence issues or oversee crime laborato-
ries (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2013a; Norris, Bonventre, Redlich, & 
Acker, 2011). At the time of this writing, two of these commissions are no longer in 
operation: The California Crime Laboratory Review Task Force was ad hoc and con-
cluded its business with a final report of findings and recommendations, and the stat-
ute enabling the Minnesota Forensic Laboratory Advisory Board was repealed by the 
state legislature because the board had inadvertently operated past its statutory expira-
tion date (Dohman, 2013). The remaining 20 commissions are described in Table 2.
The majority of the commissions were created by statute (n = 19), two were estab-
lished by state attorneys general, and one was created by a governor. The state over-
sight commissions vary in their membership, the scope of their functions, and regarding 
their authority over state forensic service providers (Norris et al., 2011). Some serve 
advisory roles, while others promulgate standards for the operation, accreditation, and 
certification of crime laboratories and their employees. Membership ranges so that 
some state commissions only include members with science, health, or forensic sci-
ence credentials (e.g., District of Columbia Science Advisory Board, Maryland 
Forensic Laboratory Advisory Committee, North Carolina Forensic Science Advisory 
Board), while others involve members representing diverse criminal justice stakehold-
ers such as prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and forensic scientists (e.g., 
Connecticut, Missouri, Texas).
The creation and assigned responsibilities of all of the forensic oversight commis-
sions cannot be characterized as responses to wrongful convictions, per se. On one 
hand, some of the commissions were established before the innocence movement 
gained momentum and helped draw attention to the role of forensic science in wrong-
ful convictions. For example, the Indiana Commission on Forensic Sciences and the 
Rhode Island Crime Laboratory Commission were founded in 1959 and 1978, respec-
tively. On the other hand, most of those that were established after the advent of the 
innocence movement do not explicitly acknowledge wrongful convictions or forensic 
science errors or misconduct in their enabling legislation. This does not exclude the 
possibility that legislators’ or governors’ knowledge of wrongful convictions influ-
enced the creation of such commissions, although it is difficult to be certain that it did. 
However, a few states enacted laws that can fairly be characterized as acknowledg-
ments (either implicit or explicit) of the role that forensic science problems played in 
wrongful convictions.
The North Carolina Forensic Science Advisory Board and Office of the Ombudsman 
is an example of a commission that was created in response to a wrongful conviction. 
In 2010, Gregory Taylor was the first person exonerated by the North Carolina 
Innocence Inquiry Commission. Taylor served 17 years in prison for a murder convic-
tion that was based, in part, on misleading forensic science testimony. Following 
Taylor’s exoneration, the state Attorney General ordered an independent audit of the 
crime laboratory that had produced the misleading evidence (News Release, 2010). 
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The audit revealed more than 200 cases in which analysts had issued misleading labo-
ratory reports by omitting the results of negative or inconclusive serology tests 
(Swecker & Wolf, 2010). One of the recommendations included in the audit report was 
for the state to develop a system for stakeholders, including prosecutors, defense attor-
neys, and the public, to report laboratory errors. According to the recommendation, 
“the objective of such a program would be the early identification and correction of 
errors and the identification of potentially flawed policies, practices and procedures” 
(Swecker & Wolf, 2010, p. 30). Consequently, the state created the North Carolina 
Forensic Science Advisory Board and the Office of the Ombudsman. The preamble to 
the Forensic Sciences Act of 2011, which created these two entities, states that the 
aims of the Act are to
encourage efforts to eliminate sources of human error in forensic examinations, . . . create 
the position of ombudsman to ensure that the best forensic processes and procedures are 
utilized in the state crime laboratory, . . . clarify the state’s obligation to disclose to the 
defendant all information relating to the testing or examination of evidence and to 
penalize omission or misrepresentation relating to disclosure, and clarify that state crime 
laboratory personnel serve the public and the criminal justice system. (North Carolina 
Session Law 2011-19, H.B. 27)
Other commissions whose enabling statutes include the power to investigate allega-
tions of professional misconduct or negligence have been established in the District of 
Columbia (DC Code 5-1501-11-12), Missouri (Mo. Rev. Stat. 650-059), and Texas 
(Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 38.01). In addition, the Montana Forensic Science 
Laboratory Advisory Board, which was created by the Attorney General, indicates on 
its website that the Board has the power to investigate misconduct or negligence.3
Another important consideration is the extent to which these entities are transparent 
and thus enable concerned stakeholders or citizens to be aware of what efforts the 
commissions have undertaken to address crime laboratory problems. Thus, we exam-
ined whether each commission has a public website (or a webpage on a government 
website) and whether public meeting notices, meeting agendas, and minutes, reports, 
and any other relevant information about the work of the entity are provided on the 
site. Available information on the Internet about the commissions ranged from virtu-
ally nothing to dedicated websites complete with information about the commission, 
meetings, and reports (see Table 2). On the more comprehensive end of the range, the 
Texas Forensic Science Commission (FSC) website (http://www.fsc.texas.gov/) is 
exemplary. The FSC website provides information about meeting dates and agendas, 
licensing and accreditation, the status and disposition of complaints against forensic 
service providers in the state, and more.
Accreditation. Of the 409 publicly funded crime laboratories documented by the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics’ (BJS) most recent census, 88% overall are accredited and 99% of 
state-level laboratories are accredited (Burch, Durose, Walsh, & Tiry, 2016). Never-
theless, as listed below, only 12 jurisdictions currently mandate accreditation by law. 
Thus, forensic laboratory accreditation presently remains largely a voluntary affair.4 
Although 88% is an impressive number that begs the question whether state accredita-
tion laws are necessary, it is important to note that the BJS Census does not capture all 
FSSPs in the country such as those that are not located in laboratories (e.g., law 
enforcement fingerprint identification units; NCFS, 2015; National Research Council, 
2009). It is estimated that many of these nonlaboratory FSSPs are not accredited 
(National Research Council, 2009).
The jurisdictions that require accreditation of at least some forensic disciplines are 
as follows: California, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas. The laws that 
mandate accreditation vary in the scope of forensic science services covered, evidence 
admissibility, and enforcement mechanisms (see National Conference of State 
Legislatures, 2013b). For example, under the Minnesota statute, forensic laboratories 
in multiple disciplines (e.g., DNA, toxicology, latent prints, firearms, and more) may 
not operate after a specified date unless they are accredited (Minn. Stat. § 299C.157). 
On the contrary, the Indiana statute addresses only DNA laboratories and does not 
specify the consequences of noncompliance (Ind. Code § 10-13-6-14). Interestingly, 
although the state of Vermont does not appear to have a statute requiring accreditation 
per se, the Vermont Innocence Protection Act notes the state legislature’s intent that 
the state crime laboratory “remain continuously accredited” (see 13 V.S.A. § 5561).
Given the recent developments at the federal level, it may be incumbent upon more states 
to develop oversight commissions and require service provider accreditation to ensure that 
the proposed national standards to improve forensic science practice are implemented.
False Confessions
Despite how counterintuitive it may seem that people would admit to crimes they did 
not commit, we know with certainty that suspects sometimes do falsely confess. Time 
and time again, false confessions are found to be one of the leading factors contributing 
to wrongful convictions. The Innocence Project reports that 88 of the first 325 DNA 
exonerations (27%) involved a false confession or admission of guilt5; on the National 
Registry, 234 of the 1,934 (12.1%) cases identified as of December 2016, including 173 
of the 812 (21.3%) criminal homicide cases, involved false confessions.
Like eyewitness errors, police interrogation tactics and suspects’ confessions have 
been heavily studied in psychology. In a 2010 “white paper” reviewing relevant 
research, Kassin et al. (2010) discussed three types of false confessions: voluntary, 
compliant, and internalized. A voluntary false confession occurs when an innocent 
person confesses to a crime “without prompting or pressure from police,” such as after 
the Lindbergh baby kidnapping, when 200 people claimed responsibility by “confess-
ing” (Kassin et al., 2010, p. 14). Compliant false confessions, on the contrary, are 
direct reactions to interrogation techniques. “In these cases, the suspect acquiesces to 
the demand for a confession to escape a stressful situation, avoid punishment, or gain 
a promised or implied reward” (Kassin et al., 2010, p. 14). Finally, internalized false 
confessions involve suspects who not only admit guilt but who actually come “to 
believe that they may have committed the crime in question, sometimes confabulating 
false memories in the process” (Kassin et al., 2010, p. 15).
The reasons for false admissions of guilt vary, but they generally implicate situa-
tional and/or dispositional risk factors. Situational factors pertain to the circumstances 
of the interrogation that may induce a suspect to confess. Dispositional factors concern 
the suspect, including such matters as age, intellect, mental and physical health, and 
whether the individual being questioned is under the influence of drugs or alcohol 
(Kassin et al., 2010).
As recognized by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), modern-day 
interrogations are designed to be intense psychological experiences. Specifically, they 
are designed to overcome a suspect’s resistance to admitting guilt, create a sense of 
hopelessness, and ultimately generate a confession. Thus, situational risk factors 
include isolating suspects from contact with others, controlling the interrogation envi-
ronment, and the use of tactics such as presenting the suspect with false evidence of 
guilt and employing techniques of minimization (such as sympathizing with the sus-
pect and offering excuses or justification for conduct) and maximization (such as by 
implying that a suspect who does not confess will suffer correspondingly harsh conse-
quences) (Kassin et al., 2010).
In addition to the interrogation tactics that may generate false confessions, disposi-
tional characteristics may make suspects more vulnerable. In particular, juveniles and 
those suffering from mental illness or intellectual disability are especially at risk, as 
evidenced by their overrepresentation among known false confessors (e.g., Kassin, 
2008; Leo, 2009; Redlich, 2010). It has also been suggested that certain personality 
traits and disorders, such as depression and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD), may be related to an increased vulnerability to interrogation tactics that can 
lead to false confessions (Gudjonsson, Sigurdsson, Asgeirsdottir, & Sigfusdottir, 2006; 
Gudjonsson, Sigurdsson, Sigfusdottir, & Young, 2012).
Although some experts have suggested changing the culture of American interroga-
tions from accusatorial and confrontational to more investigative-style interviewing as 
is practiced in the United Kingdom (for a review, see Gudjonsson & Pearse, 2011), 
another widely supported reform may help alleviate the problems that lead to false 
confessions: electronic recording of interrogations.
Recording Custodial Interrogations
In many ways, interrogations are secret affairs. They occur behind closed doors at 
police stations, insulated from scrutiny by the public and policymakers. To “lift the 
veil of secrecy” which surrounds the interrogation room, experts have recommended 
electronically recording custodial interrogations (Kassin et al., 2010, p. 25). There are 
numerous benefits to doing so. By creating an objective account of the process, record-
ing protects both suspects and interrogators. Suspects may be protected from overly 
coercive tactics, as the recording may discourage investigators from using strategies 
that are questionable or impermissible. On the contrary, recording allows officers to 
focus on the suspect and his or her statements, rather than taking notes (Geller, 1998; 
Sullivan & Vail, 2009), and also “protects the public’s interest in honest and effective 
law enforcement, and the individual interests of those police officers wrongfully 
accused of improper tactics” (Stephan v. State, 1985, p. 1161). However, a survey of 
more than 600 North American law enforcement agents revealed that only 16% worked 
in agencies that required recording interrogations (either by audio or video), even 
though more than 80% of respondents believed that interrogation sessions should be 
recorded (Kassin et al., 2007).
Electronic recording is supported not only by many scholars but also by organiza-
tions such as the American Bar Association, New York County Lawyers’ Association 
(2004); the International Chiefs of Police; and the NACDL and by law enforcement 
agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
It is important that recordings are fair, accurate, and complete accounts of interro-
gation sessions. Thus, Kassin et al. (2010) advised that recordings should be made 
“with a camera angle that focuses equally on the suspect and interrogator” (p. 25), 
because a camera focused only on the suspect may result in biased evaluations of the 
confession (e.g., Lassiter, Geers, Handley, Weiland, & Munhall, 2002; Lassiter, Slaw, 
Briggs, & Scanlan, 2006). Furthermore, it is important that the entire interrogation 
session be recorded—not just the final statement—and that the recordings be pre-
served until appeals have been exhausted.
State Practices
Identifying state policies related to interrogation recording is somewhat challenging, 
but those we found are identified in Table 3. In at least 10 states, important stakehold-
ers (e.g., appellate courts, attorneys general, police organizations, study commissions) 
have expressed a preference for and supported policies requiring the electronic record-
ing of interrogations, but no formal binding policies have been adopted (see the far-
right column of Table 3). In 25 additional states and the District of Columbia, some 
type of binding policy has been implemented throughout the jurisdiction: 16 took the 
form of legislation, eight originated with state appellate courts (either through deci-
sions, or rules of evidence or criminal procedure), one (Utah) is based in both a court 
decision and a statute, and in one state (Rhode Island) the state Police Accreditation 
Commission initiated the policy. As with eyewitness identification procedures, the 
nature and scope of these reforms vary widely.
In 20 of the 26 jurisdictions, the recording initiatives apply only to certain types of 
cases. The most common limitation is to restrict recording to felonies or some subset of 
them. For example, the Connecticut law applies to A- and B-level felonies,6 and 
Vermont’s applies to felonies involving homicide or sexual assault. Other states, such as 
Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, and New Jersey, provide a specific list of crimes to which 
the recording policy applies, generally restricted to a specific set of serious felonies. 
Washington, D.C., policy applies only to violent crimes, and Maine requires departments 
to adopt procedures for recording interrogations of suspects suspected of “serious 
crimes.” Finally, three states—California, North Carolina, and Wisconsin—require juve-
nile interrogations to be recorded, although in California the requirement only applies to 
juveniles suspected of murder.
Table 3. State Interrogation Recording Policies.
State Requireda
Limited 
cases
Length of 
recording Preservation
Consequence for 
noncompliance
Recommended/
preferred
AK X X X
AZ X
AR X X X
CA X X X X X
CO X
CT X X X X
DE X
DC X X X X
FL X
IL X X X X
IN X X X X
IA X
ME X X X
MD X X
MA X X X
MI X X X X X
MN X X X
MO X X X
MT X X X X X
NE X X X X
NH X X
NJ X X X X
NM X X X
NY X
NC X X X X X
OH X X X
OK X
OR X X X X X
PA X
RI X X X X X
TN X
TX X X X X
UT X X X
VT X X X X
WV X
WI X X X
Note. X = issue addressed in state initiative
aThe degree to which recording is actually required varies depending on the language used and the 
consequences of failing to comply, as discussed in the text.
Another important limitation concerns specifying precisely what must be recorded, 
which is mentioned in 15 states (identified in Table 3 as “Length of Recording”). 
Eleven jurisdictions specify that the recording must include the advisement and waiver 
of constitutional rights (Miranda warnings), and another two require that the entire 
interrogation must be recorded. Two states limit what must be recorded. In New 
Hampshire, if the prosecution wishes to introduce a recording of an interrogation as 
evidence, the post–Miranda interrogation recording must be complete. Texas has a 
more complex statute that does or does not require the entire interrogation session to 
be recorded, depending on the circumstances: For adults, as long as the suspect 
received and waived his or her Miranda rights beforehand, written statements result-
ing from an unrecorded interrogation may be admitted, while oral statements generally 
are not, although there are exceptions; for juveniles, recording of complete interroga-
tions is not required, but admission of statements is somewhat restricted (e.g., admis-
sible if magistrate finds the juvenile understood his rights, if statements are made in 
open court, etc.).
In addition to specifying what is and is not required to be recorded, only 13 states 
mention the preservation of such recordings; seven states—Arkansas, California, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Montana, Oregon, and Texas—mention that the recording must be 
preserved until the conviction and appeals are final, or prosecution is barred by law; 
Ohio includes the first set of requirements but states that there is no need to preserve 
recordings if no charges are brought; and North Carolina requires recordings to be pre-
served until 1 year after the completion of all appeals. California adds that in juvenile 
cases, recordings must be preserved until the suspect is no longer under the jurisdiction 
of the juvenile court. In two states (Montana and Ohio), defendants may petition for an 
extended preservation. The remaining states mention preservation of recordings, but 
lack detail. The Rhode Island initiative says that agencies should preserve recordings in 
accordance with police department policy, and Maine requires police departments to 
adopt written policies, which must include a provision for the preservation of investiga-
tive records and notes. The policies in both Indiana and Michigan mention the preserva-
tion of recordings, but neither offers additional specifics.
The majority of states that have interrogation recording policies identify the conse-
quences for the police’s failure to comply. The sanctions vary, calling into question the 
extent to which recording is actually required in some states. Nine jurisdictions pro-
vide some type of inadmissibility sanction, so that statements from an unrecorded 
interrogation cannot be used against the defendant at trial unless a recognized excep-
tion is demonstrated: Alaska, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, 
Minnesota,7 Montana, Texas,8 and Utah. Most of these policies provide an opportunity 
for the state to demonstrate, either by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the statement was voluntary and/or that certain exceptions 
apply, such as recording not being feasible. Two of the states (Montana and Utah) 
allow the defendant to request a cautionary jury instruction in the event that an unre-
corded statement is deemed admissible.
A number of states authorize less serious sanctions than excluding unrecorded 
statements from evidence. In four states—Arkansas, California, New Jersey, and 
North Carolina—the failure to record the interrogation may be considered relevant in 
determining the admissibility of a statement and/or to assessing claims of false or 
involuntary statements. California, New Jersey, and North Carolina also allow for cau-
tionary jury instructions to be delivered on request. Such instructions, which advise 
the jury about the benefits of recording and/or warn jurors about the potential prob-
lems associated with not recording, are the only available sanction in six states: 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
A few states specify other consequences when the police inexcusably fail to 
record interrogations. In New Hampshire, for instance, an incomplete recording is 
not admissible, but “evidence gathered during the interrogation may still be admit-
ted in alternative forms” (State v. Barnett, 2001, pp. 632-633). Missouri’s statute 
allows the governor to withhold state funds from agencies that fail to comply and do 
not show good faith in attempting to do so. Rhode Island threatens noncompliant 
agencies with the loss of accreditation. Statutes in New Mexico and Ohio govern the 
recording of interrogations, although no clear consequences are dictated for non-
compliance; the laws simply specify that failure to comply is not a basis for exclu-
sion of the statement.
A few other provisions of related state policies are worth mentioning. For exam-
ple, North Carolina and Vermont specify that the recording should show both the 
interrogator and the suspect. And at least three states—Michigan, Missouri, and 
Ohio—clarify that the failure to comply does not create a private cause of action for 
the defendant. Michigan’s policy states that it should be considered a directive for 
law enforcement and that it does not confer any rights to the individual being inter-
rogated. And finally, Ohio’s law specifically states that an officer’s failure to comply 
will not penalize the agency.
Understanding and Contextualizing Innocence Reform
Wrongful convictions are not a new phenomenon; in the United States, known mis-
carriages of justice date back at least to the erroneous murder convictions of Stephen 
and Jesse Boorn in the early 1800s (Warden, n.d.). Nor are the specific issues associ-
ated with wrongful convictions discussed here—eyewitness misidentification, sci-
entific errors, and false admissions—new; Borchard (1932) identified these same 
factors as contributing to wrongful convictions more than 80 years ago. For the most 
part, however, not until fairly recently did these matters spark widespread concern 
among lawmakers and justice system officials. Some have suggested that the “age of 
innocence” is now upon us (e.g., Redlich & Petrila, 2009; Zalman, 2011, p. 1499). 
As the innocence movement continues to mature, with more advocacy organizations 
focused on wrongful convictions and more legislative attention given to improving 
justice systems, it is vital that scholars expand the study of wrongful convictions to 
embrace policy initiatives.
Most states (n = 41) have addressed at least one of the three critical investigation 
stage issues known to influence the production of wrongful convictions, even if only 
with a recommendation or preference for reformed practices. Eight states have 
addressed all three. The map in Figure 1 shows how many issues have been addressed 
in each state. The descriptive summary presented here and the depiction of investiga-
tory reforms in Figure 1 are useful for criminal justice stakeholders and advocates, but 
they are equally important for the scholarly community.
Our hope is that researchers in a variety of fields—criminology and criminal jus-
tice, sociology, political science, and law, among others—will build on the portrait 
offered here to develop a fuller understanding of criminal justice policy reforms as 
they relate to wrongful convictions. In particular, areas that would benefit from theo-
retical and empirical study include the following: (a) the policy-formation process, (b) 
the implementation of specific reforms, and (c) evaluating the effectiveness of those 
reforms in reducing wrongful convictions.
Regarding the policy-formation process, more should be learned about why the 
laws discussed above were enacted. Indeed, a number of these reforms were not neces-
sarily passed because of wrongful convictions or in reaction to exonerations, but they 
nevertheless have likely been useful to help alleviate errors of justice. Scholars can 
and should conduct in-depth analyses to help explain the variability displayed in the 
map shown above—in other words, to explain why some states have passed reforms 
relating to all three investigatory stages, while others have enacted none. A cursory 
glance suggests that it is not a purely geographic phenomenon, although there does 
appear to be some clustering of reform efforts in the Northeast and the Southwest that 
Figure 1. Investigatory reforms across the United States.
is worthy of further examination. It may be that these reforms are at least partially a 
result of policy diffusion, and scholars may draw on the classic diffusion of innova-
tions framework (see Wejnert, 2002) to better understand the adoption and spread of 
innocence reforms over time. Furthermore, enacted reforms do not appear to be tied 
solely to the number of exonerations in a state. In the states that have addressed all 
three policy issues, the number of exonerations reported by the National Registry of 
Exonerations ranges from 5 (Colorado and Rhode Island) to 296 (Texas); on the con-
trary, states like California (166 exonerations) and Louisiana (46 exonerations) have 
addressed one and zero issues, respectively. It thus appears that a variety of factors can 
and do influence a state’s decision to adopt, or fail to adopt, investigatory stage 
reforms. These issues are ripe for further investigation.
Kent and Carmichael (2015) have explored such issues, identifying the number of 
policies adopted in each state which correspond to the Innocence Project’s model leg-
islation issues, including DNA preservation laws, DNA access laws, eyewitness iden-
tification reforms, recording interrogations, and exoneree compensation statutes. They 
found that the dominant political party and the presence of Innocence Network orga-
nizations both affect the likelihood that a state will adopt policies designed to guard 
against or respond to wrongful convictions. Similarly, Owens and Griffiths (2012) 
explored states’ passage of compensation statutes and reported that the number of 
exonerations in a state was the best predictor of whether a compensation law had been 
enacted, and that other political, social, and economic factors were less predictive. 
These analyses are intriguing, and the differing results suggest that further investiga-
tion is in order. For example, the factors that affect altering investigatory practices—
preconviction policies that affect the day-to-day work of police officers such as those 
described here—might be fundamentally different from those which come into play to 
help produce compensation statutes—postconviction remedies designed to provide 
monetary relief and help rectify the difficulties associated with exoneree reintegration. 
In addition, scholars can profitably analyze outcomes other than the presence or 
absence of state policies by developing dependent measures of the quality of those 
laws, as Norris (2012) did with compensation statutes. Such analyses would not only 
highlight why states do and do not adopt reforms but would also unearth factors that 
influence the quality of those reforms. Similarly, historical and qualitative research 
could produce illuminating case studies focused on individual policies, comparing 
successes and failures, to provide a fuller understanding of policy processes, framing 
techniques, and the rhetoric involved in innocence reforms.
Researchers also can delve more deeply into how adopted reforms are implemented. 
For example, how do police departments train, supervise, and evaluate officers as they 
put eyewitness reforms into practice? What challenges do they face? What conse-
quences, if any, do agencies experience for noncompliance? Do these matters vary 
between agencies or jurisdictions, and if so, why? These are important questions and 
we know little by way of answers.
In addition, significant evaluation research is necessary to better understand the 
effectiveness of the reforms suggested by academic experts and policy advocates. 
Although recommendations like the eyewitness identification measures outlined 
earlier and for recording interrogations have become common, we know relatively 
little about how effective these changes are in practice. For instance, it has been widely 
reported by psychologists that certain eyewitness reforms are likely to reduce mis-
taken identifications, but as Clark (2012) has pointed out, many of these same reforms 
have the potential to reduce accurate identifications as well. The lack of official rec-
ommendations regarding the adoption of sequential lineups, for example, likely owes 
largely to this debate, which has been concentrated within the psychological commu-
nity (e.g., Clark, 2012; Wells, Steblay, & Dysart, 2012). The countervailing views are 
based primarily on the results of laboratory studies where guilt and innocence are 
known with certainty, but evaluation research must continue to expand beyond experi-
mental laboratories to the real world. Evaluations of police departments that have 
adopted various reforms should be conducted and replicated, not only with respect to 
eyewitness reforms (Wells, Steblay, & Dysart, 2015) but to assess the effects of foren-
sic oversight and recording interrogations as well.
Furthermore, assessment of the effects of policy reforms can take a broader approach 
to see whether state-level policy mandates have an impact on the number of wrongful 
convictions. For instance, in New Jersey, nearly half (nine out of 19) of the known 
wrongful convictions that occurred before the Attorney General’s identification proce-
dures mandate involved a mistaken eyewitness identification; since the mandate, only 
one of eight involved a misidentification. Similarly, in Illinois, 21.5% (32 of 149 cases) 
of wrongful convictions before the state established their forensic oversight commis-
sion involved false or misleading forensic evidence, yet none of the 28 known wrongful 
convictions since has. Neither of these scenarios points to causality; we cannot say that 
the reforms were the cause for the decrease in that particular type of error. Furthermore, 
many of the reforms are too recent for meaningful analysis of their effects. And, as our 
ability to identify past convictions as wrongful increases, along with judges’ and pros-
ecutors’ willingness to upend such cases, the direct efficacy of implemented reforms 
will remain elusive. Still, such research should be on the radars of innocence scholars. 
Both evaluations of individual reforms in specific agencies as well as long-term, juris-
diction-level studies of the effects of new policies can provide meaningful information 
for policymakers and practitioners. Fully informed policy discussions require broad 
knowledge about the full range of effects of presumably salutary policy reforms.
Our hope is that the descriptive analysis offered here will help identify and stimu-
late research into issues of importance in the evolving innocence movement. It is time 
to build on the described baseline of innocence-related investigatory reforms—which 
provides a snapshot of what exists—and direct increased scholarly attention to under-
standing the how and why of innocence reforms.
Conclusion: The Past, Present, and Future of Innocence 
Reforms
Wrongful convictions almost certainly date back to the inception of systems of justice. 
Although some early legislation touched on related matters, such as Wisconsin’s 1913 
compensation statute, in contrast, most innocence-related reforms have occurred in the 
past 20 years and it appears unlikely that the political and cultural salience of inno-
cence will abate in the near future. The National Registry of Exonerations reported 
157 exonerations in 2015, more than in any other year. Accounts of questionable con-
victions continue to command public attention, as evidenced by the popularity of 
recent media programming such as the hit podcast, Serial, and the documentary series, 
Making a Murderer (e.g., Heese, 2016; Nyman, 2016; Woodruff, 2014). As more 
wrongful convictions come to light and more innocents are exonerated, the number of 
advocacy organizations dedicated to these issues also continues to grow. Approximately 
70 organizations currently are members of the Innocence Network and many of them 
actively work to reform state and national justice systems. Indeed, the present is a vital 
time for criminal justice reform efforts. Academic researchers must keep step with 
others addressing issues of innocence by expanding their studies to gain a deeper 
understanding of the policy dimensions of reform initiatives designed to help prevent 
and reduce the incidence of wrongful convictions.
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Notes
1. Although a full discussion is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that a grow-
ing number of states allow the admission of expert testimony at trial on the reliability of
eyewitness identification evidence. For a full discussion and summary of state laws, see
Vallas (2011).
2. Although the entities assume various names, such as committee, working group, council,
or commission, we refer to them collectively as commissions.
3. We did not examine state administrative codes for this article. While an oversight com-
mission may be created statutorily, administrative codes may outline the detailed rules
and regulations of an agency’s operation, including whether that agency has rule-making
authority. These administrative codes are worthy of their own analysis, as they may address 
issues related to wrongful convictions.
4. It should be noted that accreditation in DNA is a prerequisite for DNA laboratories that par-
ticipate in the National DNA Index System operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI Laboratory, 2016).
5. It should be noted that this number is somewhat misleading, as the Innocence Project catego-
rizes false confessions by case, rather than by the individual defendant. For example, if a case 
involved the wrongful convictions of four individuals, but only three actually confessed, they
would all get counted as “false confessions or admissions” in the Innocence Project dataset.
The actual percentage of DNA exonerees who falsely confessed is likely closer to 15%.
6. The Connecticut law also applied to capital cases; however, the state repealed its capital
punishment law in 2012.
7. Minnesota threatens that the information may be suppressed if the violation is “substantial” 
(State v. Scales, 1994).
8. Texas does not apply the inadmissibility sanction if there is evidence suggesting that asser-
tions made in the statement are found to be true.
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